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618 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
618 lines
24 KiB
Markdown
# User avatars in Tox
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## Introduction and rationale
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User avatars are small icons or images used to identify users in the friend
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list; they exist in virtually all VoIP and IM protocols and provide an easy
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way for one user to identify another in the friend list.
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This document describes the implementation of avatars in the Tox protocol,
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according to the following design considerations:
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- Avatars are handled as private information, i.e., they are only exchanged over
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Tox encrypted channels among previously authenticated friends;
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- The library treats all images as blobs and does not interpret or
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understand image formats. It only ensures that the avatar data sent by
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a user is correctly received by the other. The client application is
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responsible for validating, decoding, resizing, and presenting the
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image to the user.
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- There is a strict limit of 16 KiB to the avatar raw data size -- this
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seems suitable for practical use as, for example, the raw data of an
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uncompressed 64 x 64 pixels 24 bpp RGB bitmap is 12288 bytes long; the
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data limit provides enough space for larger bitmaps if the usual
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compressed formats are used.
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**Notice:** As designed, this limit can be changed in the future without
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breaking the protocol compatibility, but clients using the original
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limit will reject larger avatars.
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- The protocol MUST provide means to allow caching and avoid unnecessary
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data transfers.
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- Avatars are transfered between clients in a background operation.
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- Avatars are served on a "best effort" basis, without breaking clients
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which do not support them.
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- The protocol MUST resist to malicious users.
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- The protocol MUST work with both UDP and TCP networks.
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The Single Tox Standard Draft v.0.1.0 recommends implementing avatars as
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a purely client-side feature through a procedure that can be summarized as
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sending a specially named file as a file transfer request and accepting
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it silently. This procedure can be improved to provide the previously stated
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design considerations, but this requires a higher integration with the core
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protocol. Moving this feature to the core protocol also:
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- provides a simpler and cleaner interface for client applications;
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- hides protocol complexities from the client;
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- avoids code duplication and ad-hoc protocols in the clients;
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- avoids incompatibility between client implementations;
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- allows important optimizations, such as lightweight notification of
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removed and updated avatars;
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- plays well with cache schemes;
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- makes avatar transfer essentially a background operation.
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## High level description
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This is a very high level description. The usage patterns expected from
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client applications are described in the section "Using Avatars in Client
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Applications", and a low level protocol description is available in the
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section "Internal Protocol Description".)
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The avatar exchange is implemented with the following new elements in the
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Tox protocol:
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- **Avatar Information Notifications** are events which may be sent by
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a user to another anytime, but are usually sent after one of them
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connects to the network, changes his avatar, or in reply to an **avatar
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information request**. They are delivered by a very lightweight message
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but with information enough to allow a user to validate or discard an
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avatar from the local cache and to decide if it is interesting to request the
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avatar data from the peer.
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This event contains two data fields: (1) the image format, and (2) the
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cryptographic hash of the actual image data. The image format may be NONE
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(for users who have no avatar or removed their avatars) or PNG. The
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cryptographic hash is intended to be compared with the hash of the
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currently cached avatar (if any) in order to check if it is still up to date.
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- **Avatar Information Requests** are very lightweight messages sent by a
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user asking for an **avatar information notification**. They may be sent
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as part of the login process or when the client thinks the currently
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cached avatar is outdated. The receiver may or may not answer to this
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request. This message contains no data fields.
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- An **Avatar Data Request** is sent by a user asking another for his
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complete avatar data. It is sent only when the requesting user decides
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the avatar does not exist in the local cache or is outdated. The receiver
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may or may not answer to this request. This message contains no data
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fields.
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- An **Avatar Data Notification** is an event signaling the client that
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the complete avatar image data of another user is available. The actual
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data transfer is implemented using several data and control messages,
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but the details are hidden from the client applications. This event can
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only arrive in reply to an **avatar data request**.
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This event contains three data fields: (1) the image format, (2) the
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cryptographic hash of the image data, and (3) the raw image data. If the
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image format is NONE (i.e. no avatar) the hash is zeroed and the image
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data is empty. The raw image data is locally validated and ensured to
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match the hash (the event is **not** triggered otherwise).
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## API
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To implement this feature, the following public symbols were added. The
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complete API documentation is available in `tox.h`.
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```
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#define TOX_AVATAR_MAX_DATA_LENGTH 16384
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#define TOX_HASH_LENGTH 32
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/* Data formats for user avatar images */
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typedef enum {
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TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE,
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TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_PNG
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}
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TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT;
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/* Set the user avatar image data. */
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int tox_set_avatar(Tox *tox, uint8_t format, const uint8_t *data, uint32_t length);
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/* Get avatar data from the current user. */
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int tox_get_self_avatar(const Tox *tox, uint8_t *format, uint8_t *buf, uint32_t *length, uint32_t maxlen, uint8_t *hash);
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/* Generates a cryptographic hash of the given data (usually a cached avatar). */
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int tox_hash(uint8_t *hash, const uint8_t *data, const uint32_t datalen);
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/* Request avatar information from a friend. */
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int tox_request_avatar_info(const Tox *tox, const int32_t friendnumber);
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/* Send an unrequested avatar information to a friend. */
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int tox_send_avatar_info(Tox *tox, const int32_t friendnumber);
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/* Request the avatar data from a friend. */
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int tox_request_avatar_data(const Tox *tox, const int32_t friendnumber);
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/* Set the callback function for avatar data. */
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void tox_callback_avatar_info(Tox *tox, void (*function)(Tox *tox, int32_t, uint8_t, uint8_t*, void *), void *userdata);
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/* Set the callback function for avatar data. */
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void tox_callback_avatar_data(Tox *tox, void (*function)(Tox *tox, int32_t, uint8_t, uint8_t*, uint8_t*, uint32_t, void *), void *userdata);
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```
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## Using Avatars in Client Applications
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### General recommendations
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- Clients MUST NOT imply the availability of avatars in other users.
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Avatars are an optional feature and not all users and clients may
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support them;
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- Clients MUST NOT block waiting for avatar information and avatar data
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packets;
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- Clients MUST treat avatar data as insecure and potentially malicious;
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For example, users may accidentally use corrupted images as avatars,
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a malicious user may send a specially crafted image to exploit a know
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vulnerability in an image decoding library, etc. It is recommended to
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handle the avatar image data in the same way as an image downloaded
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from an unknown Internet source;
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- The peers MUST NOT assume any coupling between the operations of
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receiving an avatar information packet, sending unrequested avatar
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information packets, requesting avatar data, or receiving avatar data.
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For example, the following situations are valid:
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* A text-mode client may send avatars to other users, but never
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request them;
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* A client may not understand a particular image format and ignore
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avatars using it, but request and handle other formats;
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- Clients SHOULD implement a local cache of avatars and do not request
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avatar data from other peers unless necessary;
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- When an avatar information is received, the client should delete the
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avatar if the new avatar format is NONE or compare the hash received
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from the peer with the hash of the currently cached avatar. If they
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differ, send an avatar data request;
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- If the cached avatar is older than a given threshold, the client may
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also send an avatar info request to that friend once he is online and
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mark the avatar as updated *before* any avatar information is received
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(to not spam the peer with such requests);
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- When an avatar data notification is received, the client must update
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the cached avatar with the new one;
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- Clients should resize or crop the image to the way it better adapts
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to the client user interface;
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- If the user already have an avatar defined in the client configuration,
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it must be set before connecting to the network to avoid spurious avatar
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change notifications and unnecessary data transfers.
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- If no avatar data is available for a given friend, the client should
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show a placeholder image.
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### Interoperability and sharing avatars among different clients
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**This section is a tentative recommendation of how clients should store
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avatars to ensure local interoperability and should be revised if this
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code is accepted into Tox core.**
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It is desirable that the user avatar and the cached friends avatars could be
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shared among different Tox clients in the same system, in the spirit of the
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proposed Single Tox Standard. This not only makes switching from one client
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to another easier, but also minimizes the need of data transfers, as avatars
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already downloaded by other clients can be reused.
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Given the Tox data directory described in STS Draft v0.1.0:
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- Avatars are stored in a directory called "avatars" and named
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as "xxxxx.png", where "xxxxx" is the complete client id (but not friend
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address!) encoded as an uppercase hexadecimal string and "png" is the
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extension for the PNG avatar. As new image formats may be used in the
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future, clients should ensure no other file "xxxxx.*" exists. No file
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should be kept for a user who has no avatar.
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- The client's own avatar is not special and is stored like any other. This
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is partially for simplicity, and partially in anticipation of profiles.
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- The avatar should be stored as its recieved, before any modifications by
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the client for display purposes.
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- The hash, as calculated by toxcore and passed in to the data callback,
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should be saved in "avatars/xxxxx.hash" where "xxxxx" means the
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same thing as for avatars. (The filename is longer than the file :) )
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**To be discussed:** User keys are usually presented in Tox clients as
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upper case strings, but lower case file names are more usual.
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Example for Linux and other Unix systems, assuming an user called "gildor":
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Tox data directory: /home/gildor/.config/tox/
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Tox data file: /home/gildor/.config/tox/data
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Avatar data dir: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/
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Gildor's avatar: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/E5809EEF5F11AB29B9BDF543C05B58DDF454AB9CA176C235C7699FDC2757DC33.png
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Elrond's avatar: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/43656C65627269616E20646F6E277420546F782E426164206D656D6F72696573.png
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Elrond's hash: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/43656C65627269616E20646F6E277420546F782E426164206D656D6F72696573.hash
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Elladan's avatar: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/49486174655768656E48756D616E735468696E6B49416D4D7942726F74686572.png
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Elladan's hash: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/49486174655768656E48756D616E735468696E6B49416D4D7942726F74686572.hash
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Elrohir's avatar /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/726568746F7242794D6D41496B6E696854736E616D75486E6568576574614849.png
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Elrohir's hash: /home/gildor/.config/tox/avatars/726568746F7242794D6D41496B6E696854736E616D75486E6568576574614849.hash
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This recommendation is partially implemented by "testing/test_avatars.c".
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### Common operations
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These are minimal examples of how perform common operations with avatar
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functions. For a complete, working, example, see `testing/test_avatars.c`.
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#### Setting an avatar for the current user
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In this example `load_data_file` is just an hypothetical function that loads
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data from a file into the buffer and sets the length accordingly.
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uint8_t buf[TOX_AVATAR_MAX_DATA_LENGTH];
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uint32_t len;
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if (load_data_file("avatar.png", buf, &len) == 0)
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if (tox_set_avatar(tox, TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_PNG, buf, len) != 0)
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fprintf(stderr, "Failed to set avatar.\n");
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If the user is connected, this function will also notify all connected
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friends about the avatar change.
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If the user already have an avatar defined in the client configuration, it
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must be set before connecting to the network to avoid spurious avatar change
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notifications and unnecessary data transfers.
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#### Removing the avatar from the current user
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To remove an avatar, an application must set it to `TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE`.
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tox_set_avatar(tox, TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE, NULL, 0);
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If the user is connected, this function will also notify all connected
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friends about the avatar change.
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#### Receiving avatar information from friends
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All avatar information is passed to a callback function with the prototype:
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void function(Tox *tox, int32_t friendnumber, uint8_t format,
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uint8_t *hash, uint8_t *data, uint32_t datalen, void *userdata)
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As in this example:
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static void avatar_info_cb(Tox *tox, int32_t friendnumber, uint8_t format,
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uint8_t *hash, void *userdata)
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{
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printf("Receiving avatar information from friend %d. Format = %d\n",
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friendnumber, format);
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printf("Data hash: ");
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hex_printf(hash, TOX_HASH_LENGTH); /* Hypothetical function */
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printf("\n");
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}
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And, somewhere in the Tox initialization calls, set if as the callback to be
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triggered when an avatar information event arrives:
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tox_callback_avatar_info(tox, avatar_info_cb, NULL);
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A typical client will test the currently cached avatar against the hash given
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in the avatar information event and, if needed, request the avatar data.
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#### Receiving avatar data from friends
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Avatar data events are only delivered in reply of avatar data requests which
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**should** only be sent after getting the user avatar information (format
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and hash) from an avatar information event and checking it against a local
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cache.
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For this, an application must define an avatar information callback which
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checks the local avatar cache and emits an avatar data request if necessary:
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static void avatar_info_cb(Tox *tox, int32_t friendnumber, uint8_t format,
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uint8_t *hash, void *userdata)
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{
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printf("Receiving avatar information from friend %d. Format = %d\n",
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friendnumber, format);
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if (format = TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE) {
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/* User has no avatar or removed the avatar */
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delete_avatar_from_cache(tox, friendnumber);
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} else {
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/* Use the received hash to check if the cached avatar is
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still updated. */
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if (!is_user_cached_avatar_updated(tox, friendnumber, hash)) {
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/* User avatar is outdated, send data request */
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tox_request_avatar_data(tox, friendnumber);
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}
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}
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}
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Then define an avatar data callback to store the received data in the local
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cache:
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static void avatar_data_cb(Tox *tox, int32_t friendnumber, uint8_t format,
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uint8_t *hash, uint8_t *data, uint32_t datalen, void *userdata)
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{
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if (format = TOX_AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE) {
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/* User has no avatar or removed the avatar */
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delete_avatar_from_cache(tox, friendnumber);
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} else {
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save_avatar_data_to_cache(tox, friendnumber, format, hash,
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data, datalen);
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}
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}
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And, finally, register both callbacks somewhere in the Tox initialization
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calls:
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tox_callback_avatar_info(tox, avatar_info_cb, NULL);
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tox_callback_avatar_data(tox, avatar_data_cb, NULL);
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In the previous examples, implementation of the functions to check, store
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and retrieve data from the cache were omitted for brevity. These functions
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will also need to get the friend client ID (public key) from they friend
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number and, usually, convert it from a byte string to a hexadecimal
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string. A complete, yet more complex, example is available in the file
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`testing/test_avatars.c`.
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## Internal Protocol Description
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### New packet types
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The avatar transfer protocol adds the following new packet types and ids:
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO_REQ = 52
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO = 53
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL = 54
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START = 55
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_PUSH = 56
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### Requesting avatar information
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To request avatar information, an user must send a packet of type
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`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO_REQ`. This packet has no data fields. Upon
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receiving this packet, a client which supports avatars should answer with
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a `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO`. The sender must accept that the friend may
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not answer at all.
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### Receiving avatar information
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Avatar information arrives in a packet of type `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO` with
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the following structure:
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO (53)
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Packet data size: 33 bytes
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[1: uint8_t format][32: uint8_t hash]
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Where 'format' is the image data format, one of the following:
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0 = AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE (no avatar set)
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1 = AVATAR_FORMAT_PNG
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and 'hash' is the SHA-256 message digest of the avatar data.
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This packet may be sent at any time and no previous request is required.
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Clients should send this packet upon connection or when a friend
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connects, in the same way Tox sends name, status and action information.
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### Requesting avatar data
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Transmission of avatar data is a multi-step procedure using three new packet
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types.
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- Packet `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL` have the format:
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL (54)
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Packet data size: 1 byte
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[1: uint8_t op]
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where 'op' is a code signaling both an operation request or a status
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return, which semantics are explained bellow. The following values are
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defined:
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0 = AVATAR_DATACONTROL_REQ
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1 = AVATAR_DATACONTROL_ERROR
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- Packet `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START` have the following format:
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PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START (55)
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Packet data size: 37 bytes
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[1: uint8_t format][32: uint8_t hash][1: uint32_t data_length]
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where 'format' is the image format, with the same values accepted for
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the field 'format' in packet type `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO`, 'hash' is
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the SHA-256 cryptographic hash of the avatar raw data and 'data_length'
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is the total number of bytes the raw avatar data.
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|
- Packet `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_PUSH` has no format structure, just up
|
|
to `AVATAR_DATA_MAX_CHUNK_SIZE` bytes of raw avatar image data; this
|
|
value is defined according to the maximum amount of data a Tox crypted
|
|
packet can hold.
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|
|
|
|
|
|
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The following procedure assumes that a client "A" is requesting avatar data
|
|
from a client "B":
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|
|
|
- "A" must initialize its control structures and mark its data transfer
|
|
as not yet started. Then it requests avatar data from "B" by sending a
|
|
packet `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL` with 'op' set to
|
|
`AVATAR_DATACONTROL_REQ`.
|
|
|
|
- If "B" accepts this transfer, it answers by sending an
|
|
`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START` with the fields 'format', 'hash' and
|
|
'data_length' set to the respective values from the current avatar.
|
|
If "B" has no avatar set, 'format' must be `AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE`, 'hash'
|
|
must be zeroed and 'data_length' must be zero.
|
|
|
|
If "B" does not accept sending the avatar, it may send a packet
|
|
`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL` with the field 'op' set to
|
|
`AVATAR_DATACONTROL_ERROR` or simply ignore this request. "A" must cope
|
|
with this.
|
|
|
|
If "B" have an avatar, it sends a variable number of
|
|
`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_PUSH` packets with the avatar data in a single
|
|
shot.
|
|
|
|
- Upon receiving a `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START`, "A" checks if it
|
|
has sent a data request to "B". If not, just ignores the packet.
|
|
|
|
If "A" really requested avatar data and the format is `AVATAR_FORMAT_NONE`,
|
|
it triggers the avatar data callback, and clears all the temporary data,
|
|
finishing the process. For other formats, "A" just waits for packets
|
|
of type `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_PUSH`.
|
|
|
|
- Upon receiving a `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_PUSH`, "A" checks if it really
|
|
sent an avatar data request and if the `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START` was
|
|
already received. If this conditions are valid, it checks if the total
|
|
length of the data already stored in the receiving buffer plus the data
|
|
present in the push packet is still less or equal than
|
|
`TOX_AVATAR_MAX_DATA_LENGTH`. If invalid, it replies with a
|
|
`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL` with the field 'op' set to
|
|
`AVATAR_DATACONTROL_ERROR`.
|
|
|
|
If valid, "A" updates the 'bytes_received' counter and concatenates the
|
|
newly arrived data to the buffer.
|
|
|
|
The "A" checks if all the data was already received by comparing the
|
|
counter 'bytes_received' with the field 'total_length'. If they are
|
|
equal, "A" takes a SHA-256 hash of the data and compares it with the
|
|
hash stored in the field 'hash' received from the first
|
|
`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_START`.
|
|
|
|
If the hashes match, the avatar data was correctly received and "A"
|
|
triggers the avatar data callback, and clears all the temporary data,
|
|
finishing the process.
|
|
|
|
If not all data was received, "A" simply waits for more data.
|
|
|
|
Client "A" is always responsible for controlling the transfer and
|
|
validating the data received. "B" don't need to keep any state for the
|
|
protocol, have full control over the data sent and should implement
|
|
some transfer limit for the data it sends.
|
|
|
|
- Any peer receiving a `PACKET_ID_AVATAR_DATA_CONTROL` with the field 'op'
|
|
set to `AVATAR_DATACONTROL_ERROR` clears any existing control state and
|
|
finishes sending or receiving data.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|
## Security considerations
|
|
|
|
The major security implication of background data transfers of large objects,
|
|
like avatars, is the possibility of exhausting the network resources from a
|
|
client. This problem is exacerbated when there is the possibility of an
|
|
amplification attack as happens, for example, when sending a very small
|
|
avatar request message will force the user to reply with a larger avatar
|
|
data message.
|
|
|
|
The present proposal mitigates this situation by:
|
|
|
|
- Only transferring data between previously authenticated friends;
|
|
|
|
- Enforcing strict limits on the avatar data size;
|
|
|
|
- Providing an alternate, smaller, message to cooperative users refresh
|
|
avatar information when nothing has changed (`PACKET_ID_AVATAR_INFO`);
|
|
|
|
- Having per-friend data transfer limit. As the current protocol still
|
|
allows an user to request avatar data again and again, the implementation
|
|
limits the amount of data a particular user can request for some time. The
|
|
exact values are defined in constants `AVATAR_DATA_TRANSFER_LIMIT` and
|
|
`AVATAR_DATA_TRANSFER_TIMEOUT` in file `Messenger.c`.
|
|
|
|
- Making the requester responsible for storing partial data and state
|
|
information;
|
|
|
|
Another problem present in the avatars is the possibility of a friend send
|
|
a maliciously crafted image intended to exploit vulnerabilities in image
|
|
decoders. Without an intermediate server to recompress and validate and
|
|
convert the images to neutral formats, the client applications must handle
|
|
this situation by themselves using stable and secure image libraries and
|
|
imposing limits on the maximum amount of system resources the decoding
|
|
process can take. Images coming from Tox friends must be treated in the same
|
|
way as images coming from random Internet sources.
|