Recenly, Debian based distribution kernels started activating the Tomoyo Linux
Security Module by default. Even if it is not used, this changes the behavior
of `/dev/fd` (pointing to `/proc/self/fd` by default), which Sandbox2 needs during
`execveat()`.
As a result, Sandbox2 and Sandboxed API always fail without one of the following
conditions
- `/proc` mounted within the sandboxee
- `/dev` mounted
- `/dev/fd` symlinked to `/proc/self/fd` in the sandboxee's mount namespace
Some code pointers to upstream Linux 5.12.2:
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/fs/exec.c#L1775
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c#L107
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/security/tomoyo/domain.c#L729
To find out whether your system has Tomoyo enabled, use this command, similar to
what this change does in code:
```
$ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm | grep tomoyo && echo "Tomoyo active"
capability,yama,apparmor,tomoyo
Tomoyo active
```
The config setting `CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY` controls which LSMs are built into
the kernel by default.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 372919524
Change-Id: I2181819c04f15f57d96c44ea9977d0def4a1b623
Using C++17 means we can get rid of many `#ifdef`s by using `if constexpr`.
This way, we ensure that both branches compile and still retain zero runtime
overhead.
Note that open source builds of Sandboxed API do not ship with sanitizer
configurations yet. This will be added in follow-up changes.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 354932160
Change-Id: I3678dffc47ea873919f0a8c01f3a7d999fc29a5b
Also accept `absl::string_view` and `absl::Span<const std::string>` arguments.
Drive-by:
- Move using declaration into namespace
PiperOrigin-RevId: 354271016
Change-Id: Iadd873377e51cac7fa3800aab1f9e85ff94bd4e9
Only externally visible changes should be a few changed includes as well as
some formatting changes.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 353226662
Change-Id: Iebf5be13774efcbd94c5d5a17b9b27e47275b229
This change should make it less confusing where utility code comes from.
Having it in two places made sense when we were debating whether to publish
Sandbox2 separately, but not any longer.
Follow-up changes will move `sandbox2/util.h` and rename the remaining
`sandbox2/util` folder.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 351601640
Change-Id: I6256845261f610e590c25e2c59851cc51da2d778
The lookup is not on the hot path and this removes the SYSCALLS_UNUSED macros.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 344240762
Change-Id: I324bd798945851ac0b92e257206525eab4ec36e5
This allows us to remove some uses of macros.
Related changes:
- Make it clear that we support hosting sandboxed binaries from 64-bit
processes only. CPU architectures are x86-64 and POWER64 (little endian).
- Introduced CPU architecture macros, abstracting away compiler specifics
PiperOrigin-RevId: 330918134
Change-Id: Ife7ad5f14723eec9f68055127b0583b8aecd38dd
This addresses a latency issue - chroot_fs_refs called inside pivot_root
in the kernel can take several milliseconds on machines with many threads
running.
This might not always reduce latency for custom forkservers, as additional
fork can be more costly than pivot_root.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 281306284
Change-Id: If503ac76a70e5438e94caf708d79cb0219c66def
These where inadvertently introduced in an internal cleanup change.
This change also removes a C++17-ism in var_proto.h. To make things easier for
downstream projects, we should stick to C++11 for the time being.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 271117700
Change-Id: I4eaacec88be16e1a561d3f77a61acce0a1af0b9d
Also properly check status of send and use one-byte messages
to avoid issues with partial send, receive.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 258362495
Change-Id: I889b4699c100c80d15b129bf3a254f5442405bc2
After all requested filesystem mounts are fully mounted under a sandboxee's virtual chroot, print a list of the outside paths and a list of the inside chroot paths that the outside paths are mapped to. This provides a valuable insight while debugging sandboxed binaries.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 247130923
Change-Id: I42b4b3db68d826587c0fe8127aabbead38bc6f20
