Unotify based monitor should bring big performance wins
if the sandboxee heavily uses threading or signals.
Some of the features are not supported in that mode:
- execveat is always allowed instead of just the initial one
- stack traces are not collected on normal exit or if the process is terminated by signal
PiperOrigin-RevId: 515040101
Change-Id: Ia5574d34b4ff7e91e3601edb8c9cb913e011fbf6
Follow-up changes might be required to fully fix up the contrib sandboxes.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 482475998
Change-Id: Iff631eb838a024b2f047a1be61bb27e35a8ff2f4
The existing function signature took a `unique_ptr<>` owning a vector, and
took `nullptr` to mean an empty set of capabilities. This is more naturally
modeled by taking the vector directly and `std::move`-ing it.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 384214849
Change-Id: I177f04a06803ae00429b19a1f3f12e7be04d2908
- Assign to `*mutable_XXX()` instead of looping
- Use a const ref for capabilities
PiperOrigin-RevId: 384192675
Change-Id: I4db3d0c8ce0d7f6acc9fd486a2409962516b5fe7
This change should make it less confusing where utility code comes from.
Having it in two places made sense when we were debating whether to publish
Sandbox2 separately, but not any longer.
Follow-up changes will move `sandbox2/util.h` and rename the remaining
`sandbox2/util` folder.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 351601640
Change-Id: I6256845261f610e590c25e2c59851cc51da2d778
This change enables support for 32-bit ARM, as used by embedded controllers and older phones.
Note: This does not support 32-bit sandboxees on AArch64. Both sandboxee and host code must have the same bitness.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 347835193
Change-Id: I6395882677530f9862f118d2dc10230a61049836
The default policy causes immediate termination of a sandboxee that
calls `bpf`(2).
This does not allow for try-call use of `bpf()` to test for optional
features.
To support such try-call use cases, sandboxes would like to say:
```
sandbox2::PolicyBuilder builder;
builder.BlockSyscallWithErrno(__NR_bpf, EPERM);
```
but this doesn't work because the default policy unconditionally treats
`bpf()` as a sandbox violation.
Remove the bpf violation check from the policy if `bpf()` is explicitly
blocked with an errno.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 345239389
Change-Id: I7fcfd3a938c610c8679edf8e1fa0238b32cc9db4
This is a work in progress:
- Syscall tables need work
- Only tested on real hardware using one of our test hosts
As a drive-by, this change also enables the open source version to function on
POWER.
Another side-effect of this change is that the default policies no longer
check for different host architectures at runtime. On x86_64, we do not need
to check for PPC or AArch64 specifice and vice versa.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 331137472
Change-Id: Ic6d6be5cbe61d83dbe13d5a0be036871754b2eb8
This allows us to remove some uses of macros.
Related changes:
- Make it clear that we support hosting sandboxed binaries from 64-bit
processes only. CPU architectures are x86-64 and POWER64 (little endian).
- Introduced CPU architecture macros, abstracting away compiler specifics
PiperOrigin-RevId: 330918134
Change-Id: Ife7ad5f14723eec9f68055127b0583b8aecd38dd
Since the interface generator is invoked via a Bazel macro, it will be
expanded in the embedding context of the project using SAPI, so package access
needs to go through the full workspace root @com_google_sandboxed_api.
This change also modifies the CMakeLists.txt accordingly, as the "external"
subdirectory is no longer needed/wanted.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 255918784
Change-Id: I052c687509f65fef7f011a9d1a074a171595330f
