If the platform does not have `std::string_view` (i.e. `absl::string_view` is not an alias of `std::string_view`) the lookup will cause build failure.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 503159858
Change-Id: Ide8229ae0219d1cb6f3b36aba26da8d53183bc4b
Libunwind sandbox no longer needs to join sandboxee's userns.
This cleans up a lot of special handling for the libunwind sandbox.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 503140778
Change-Id: I020ea3adda05ae6ff74137b668a5fa7509c138f8
Recenly, Debian based distribution kernels started activating the Tomoyo Linux
Security Module by default. Even if it is not used, this changes the behavior
of `/dev/fd` (pointing to `/proc/self/fd` by default), which Sandbox2 needs during
`execveat()`.
As a result, Sandbox2 and Sandboxed API always fail without one of the following
conditions
- `/proc` mounted within the sandboxee
- `/dev` mounted
- `/dev/fd` symlinked to `/proc/self/fd` in the sandboxee's mount namespace
Some code pointers to upstream Linux 5.12.2:
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/fs/exec.c#L1775
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c#L107
- https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v5.12.2/source/security/tomoyo/domain.c#L729
To find out whether your system has Tomoyo enabled, use this command, similar to
what this change does in code:
```
$ cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm | grep tomoyo && echo "Tomoyo active"
capability,yama,apparmor,tomoyo
Tomoyo active
```
The config setting `CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY` controls which LSMs are built into
the kernel by default.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 372919524
Change-Id: I2181819c04f15f57d96c44ea9977d0def4a1b623
This is needed for some compiler versions where `absl::string_view` == `std::string_view`.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 367392064
Change-Id: Id91d23510501df4745f386475ef9049d94062e1b
Now unwinding will properly handle binaries inside bind-mounted directories.
Drive-by:
- Get rid of n^2 path handling
- Get rid of namespace alias
PiperOrigin-RevId: 358353666
Change-Id: Ieec7690ec6a1ae6d358de375220566b69e8cb094
Only externally visible changes should be a few changed includes as well as
some formatting changes.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 353226662
Change-Id: Iebf5be13774efcbd94c5d5a17b9b27e47275b229
This change should make it less confusing where utility code comes from.
Having it in two places made sense when we were debating whether to publish
Sandbox2 separately, but not any longer.
Follow-up changes will move `sandbox2/util.h` and rename the remaining
`sandbox2/util` folder.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 351601640
Change-Id: I6256845261f610e590c25e2c59851cc51da2d778
This change enables support for 32-bit ARM, as used by embedded controllers and older phones.
Note: This does not support 32-bit sandboxees on AArch64. Both sandboxee and host code must have the same bitness.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 347835193
Change-Id: I6395882677530f9862f118d2dc10230a61049836
The defined raw logging macros should be compatible with Abseil and
we can remove our version once Abseil releases theirs.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 347354273
Change-Id: I178a89cfd2e19bcd707a06fa9dfd7b767e2b654b
This is a work in progress:
- Syscall tables need work
- Only tested on real hardware using one of our test hosts
As a drive-by, this change also enables the open source version to function on
POWER.
Another side-effect of this change is that the default policies no longer
check for different host architectures at runtime. On x86_64, we do not need
to check for PPC or AArch64 specifice and vice versa.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 331137472
Change-Id: Ic6d6be5cbe61d83dbe13d5a0be036871754b2eb8
This allows us to remove some uses of macros.
Related changes:
- Make it clear that we support hosting sandboxed binaries from 64-bit
processes only. CPU architectures are x86-64 and POWER64 (little endian).
- Introduced CPU architecture macros, abstracting away compiler specifics
PiperOrigin-RevId: 330918134
Change-Id: Ife7ad5f14723eec9f68055127b0583b8aecd38dd
The previous one was not quite correct in cases where the outside binary path
did not match the inside path. This should be fixed with this.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 276075886
Change-Id: I1c7c4fa0191960437a2d2360b805c7098b1407c9
After all requested filesystem mounts are fully mounted under a sandboxee's virtual chroot, print a list of the outside paths and a list of the inside chroot paths that the outside paths are mapped to. This provides a valuable insight while debugging sandboxed binaries.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 247130923
Change-Id: I42b4b3db68d826587c0fe8127aabbead38bc6f20
