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35 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
35 lines
1.1 KiB
Plaintext
List of possible attacks on the current DHT:
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create thousands of fake nodes cloning one client_id and flood our DHT with
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them.
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create thousands of "real" nodes that do nothing but shit up our DHT with fake
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crap.
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...
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Possible solutions:
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Each client_id is the public key of the peer so it would be trivial to encrypt
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the DHT requests with crypto_box(). This would completely defeat the first
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attack.
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Make each peer send the information of at least one of his online friends in
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every send nodes response. (Might be bad as any node can now know who our
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friends are)
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Limit the maximum number of peers with identical ips that we keep connected to
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in our DHT. (Not a real solution)
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Require each node to solve some kind of captcha in order to connect to the
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network. (Bad idea.)
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Require nodes to crack hashes or solve other computationally intensive
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problems in order to be accepted in the network. (Kind of like bitcoin)(This is
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probably a bad idea as our application needs to work on phones which are low
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power devices)
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Make each node test other nodes to see if they respond correctly before sending
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them as part of their send nodes response.
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...
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