chore: Minor cleanups of warnings given by cppcheck.

This commit is contained in:
iphydf 2021-12-09 11:07:45 +00:00
parent 044a93081a
commit fa359091c7
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 3855DBA2D74403C9
10 changed files with 40 additions and 54 deletions

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@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ START_TEST(test_basic)
uint8_t packet_resp[4096];
int recv_data_len = net_recv(sock, packet_resp, 2 + 2 + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE);
ck_assert_msg(recv_data_len == 2 + 2 + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE,
"Failed to receive server response to request. %u", recv_data_len);
"Failed to receive server response to request. %d", recv_data_len);
memcpy(&size, packet_resp, 2);
ck_assert_msg(net_ntohs(size) == 2 + CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE,
"Wrong packet size for request response.");

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@ -135,35 +135,29 @@ END_TEST
START_TEST(test_endtoend)
{
unsigned char pk1[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char sk1[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char sk2[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char k1[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char k2[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char n[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char m[500];
unsigned char c1[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c2[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c3[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c4[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char m1[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m2[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m3[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m4[sizeof(m)];
uint16_t mlen;
uint16_t c1len, c2len, c3len, c4len;
uint16_t m1len, m2len, m3len, m4len;
uint8_t testno;
// Test 100 random messages and keypairs
for (testno = 0; testno < 100; testno++) {
for (uint8_t testno = 0; testno < 100; testno++) {
unsigned char pk1[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char sk1[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char sk2[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char k1[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char k2[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned char n[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE];
unsigned char m[500];
unsigned char c1[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c2[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c3[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char c4[sizeof(m) + CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE];
unsigned char m1[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m2[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m3[sizeof(m)];
unsigned char m4[sizeof(m)];
//Generate random message (random length from 100 to 500)
mlen = (random_u32() % 400) + 100;
const uint16_t mlen = (random_u32() % 400) + 100;
rand_bytes(m, mlen);
rand_bytes(n, CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE);
@ -178,10 +172,10 @@ START_TEST(test_endtoend)
ck_assert_msg(memcmp(k1, k2, CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE) == 0, "encrypt_precompute: bad");
//Encrypt all four ways
c1len = encrypt_data(pk2, sk1, n, m, mlen, c1);
c2len = encrypt_data(pk1, sk2, n, m, mlen, c2);
c3len = encrypt_data_symmetric(k1, n, m, mlen, c3);
c4len = encrypt_data_symmetric(k2, n, m, mlen, c4);
const uint16_t c1len = encrypt_data(pk2, sk1, n, m, mlen, c1);
const uint16_t c2len = encrypt_data(pk1, sk2, n, m, mlen, c2);
const uint16_t c3len = encrypt_data_symmetric(k1, n, m, mlen, c3);
const uint16_t c4len = encrypt_data_symmetric(k2, n, m, mlen, c4);
ck_assert_msg(c1len == c2len && c1len == c3len && c1len == c4len, "cyphertext lengths differ");
ck_assert_msg(c1len == mlen + (uint16_t)CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE, "wrong cyphertext length");
@ -189,10 +183,10 @@ START_TEST(test_endtoend)
&& memcmp(c1, c4, c1len) == 0, "crypertexts differ");
//Decrypt all four ways
m1len = decrypt_data(pk2, sk1, n, c1, c1len, m1);
m2len = decrypt_data(pk1, sk2, n, c1, c1len, m2);
m3len = decrypt_data_symmetric(k1, n, c1, c1len, m3);
m4len = decrypt_data_symmetric(k2, n, c1, c1len, m4);
const uint16_t m1len = decrypt_data(pk2, sk1, n, c1, c1len, m1);
const uint16_t m2len = decrypt_data(pk1, sk2, n, c1, c1len, m2);
const uint16_t m3len = decrypt_data_symmetric(k1, n, c1, c1len, m3);
const uint16_t m4len = decrypt_data_symmetric(k2, n, c1, c1len, m4);
ck_assert_msg(m1len == m2len && m1len == m3len && m1len == m4len, "decrypted text lengths differ");
ck_assert_msg(m1len == mlen, "wrong decrypted text length");

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@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ START_TEST(test_addr_resolv_localhost)
ck_assert_msg(res > 0, "Resolver failed: %d, %s", error, strerror);
net_kill_strerror(strerror);
ck_assert_msg(net_family_is_ipv6(ip.family), "Expected family TOX_AF_INET6 (%u), got %u.", TOX_AF_INET6,
ck_assert_msg(net_family_is_ipv6(ip.family), "Expected family TOX_AF_INET6 (%d), got %u.", TOX_AF_INET6,
ip.family.value);
IP6 ip6_loopback = get_ip6_loopback();
ck_assert_msg(!memcmp(&ip.ip.v6, &ip6_loopback, sizeof(IP6)), "Expected ::1, got %s.",
@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ START_TEST(test_addr_resolv_localhost)
net_kill_strerror(strerror);
#if USE_IPV6
ck_assert_msg(net_family_is_ipv6(ip.family), "Expected family TOX_AF_INET6 (%u), got %u.", TOX_AF_INET6,
ck_assert_msg(net_family_is_ipv6(ip.family), "Expected family TOX_AF_INET6 (%d), got %u.", TOX_AF_INET6,
ip.family.value);
ck_assert_msg(!memcmp(&ip.ip.v6, &ip6_loopback, sizeof(IP6)), "Expected ::1, got %s.",
ip_ntoa(&ip, ip_str, sizeof(ip_str)));

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@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static void test_few_clients(void)
uint8_t address[TOX_ADDRESS_SIZE];
tox_self_get_address(tox2, address);
uint32_t test = tox_friend_add(tox3, address, (const uint8_t *)"Gentoo", 7, nullptr);
ck_assert_msg(test == 0, "Failed to add friend error code: %i", test);
ck_assert_msg(test == 0, "Failed to add friend error code: %u", test);
uint8_t off = 1;

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@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void test_set_name(void)
tox_callback_friend_name(tox2, nickchange_callback);
Tox_Err_Set_Info err_n;
bool ret = tox_self_set_name(tox1, (const uint8_t *)NICKNAME, sizeof(NICKNAME), &err_n);
ck_assert_msg(ret && err_n == TOX_ERR_SET_INFO_OK, "tox_self_set_name failed because %u\n", err_n);
ck_assert_msg(ret && err_n == TOX_ERR_SET_INFO_OK, "tox_self_set_name failed because %d\n", err_n);
bool nickname_updated = false;

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@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ static void test_set_status_message(void)
tox_callback_friend_status_message(tox2, status_callback);
bool ret = tox_self_set_status_message(tox1, (const uint8_t *)STATUS_MESSAGE, sizeof(STATUS_MESSAGE),
&err_n);
ck_assert_msg(ret && err_n == TOX_ERR_SET_INFO_OK, "tox_self_set_status_message failed because %u\n", err_n);
ck_assert_msg(ret && err_n == TOX_ERR_SET_INFO_OK, "tox_self_set_status_message failed because %d\n", err_n);
bool status_updated = false;

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@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ static void t_toxav_call_cb(ToxAV *av, uint32_t friend_number, bool audio_enable
static void t_toxav_call_state_cb(ToxAV *av, uint32_t friend_number, uint32_t state, void *user_data)
{
printf("Handling CALL STATE callback: %d\n", state);
printf("Handling CALL STATE callback: %u\n", state);
((CallControl *)user_data)->state = state;
}

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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void t_toxav_call_cb(ToxAV *av, uint32_t friend_number, bool audio_enable
static void t_toxav_call_state_cb(ToxAV *av, uint32_t friend_number, uint32_t state, void *user_data)
{
printf("Handling CALL STATE callback: %d %p\n", state, (void *)av);
printf("Handling CALL STATE callback: %u %p\n", state, (void *)av);
((CallControl *)user_data)[friend_number].state = state;
}

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@ -2614,17 +2614,9 @@ void do_messenger(Messenger *m, void *userdata)
LOGGER_TRACE(m->log, "Friend num in DHT %u != friend num in msger %u", dht_get_num_friends(m->dht), m->numfriends);
}
Friend *msgfptr;
DHT_Friend *dhtfptr;
for (uint32_t friend_idx = 0; friend_idx < num_dhtfriends; ++friend_idx) {
if (dht2m[friend_idx] >= 0) {
msgfptr = &m->friendlist[dht2m[friend_idx]];
} else {
msgfptr = nullptr;
}
dhtfptr = dht_get_friend(m->dht, friend_idx);
const Friend *const msgfptr = dht2m[friend_idx] >= 0 ? &m->friendlist[dht2m[friend_idx]] : nullptr;
const DHT_Friend *const dhtfptr = dht_get_friend(m->dht, friend_idx);
if (msgfptr) {
char id_str[IDSTRING_LEN];

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@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
// "function") is used. Note the semantic difference: alloca'd memory does not
// get freed at the end of the declaration's scope. Do not use VLA() in loops or
// you may run out of stack space.
#if !defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
#if !defined(DISABLE_VLA) && !defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
// C99 VLAs.
#define VLA(type, name, size) type name[size]
#define SIZEOF_VLA sizeof