Added text document explaining what needs to be done before TCP can be merged.

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irungentoo 2014-04-18 22:00:12 -04:00
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The TCP client and TCP server part are in a state that can be considered
feature complete. Why doesn't Tox support TCP yet even if those parts are
complete?
The answer is that a way to ensure a smooth switchover between the TCP and UDP
needs to be added. If Tox first connects to the other user using TCP but then
due to pure chance manages to connect using the faster direct UDP connection
Tox must switch seamlessly from the TCP to the UDP connection without there
being any data loss or the other user going offline and then back online. The
transition must be seamless whatever both connected users are doing be it
transferring files or simply chatting together.
Possible evil/bad or simply TCP relays going offline must not impact the
connection between both clients.
Typically Tox will use more than one TCP relay to connect to other peers for
maximum connection stability which means there must be a way for Tox to take
advantage of multiple relays in a way that the user will never be aware if one
of them goes offline/tries to slow down the connection/decides to corrupt
packets/etc..
To accomplish this Tox needs something between the low level protocol (TCP) and
high level Tox messaging protocol hence the name middle level.
The plan is to move some functionality from lossless_UDP to a higher level:
more specifically the functionality for detecting which packets a peer is
missing and the ability to request and send them again. lossless UDP uses plain
text packets to request missing packets from the other peer while Tox is
currently designed to kill the connection if any packet tampering is detected.
This works very well when connecting directly with someone because if the
attacker can modify packets it means he can kill your connection anyways. With
TCP relays however that is not the case as such the packets used to request
missing packets must be encrypted. If it is detected that a packet has been
tampered, the connection must stay intact while the evil relay must be
disconnected from and replaced with a good relay, the behavior must be the same
as if the relay had just suddenly gone online. Of course something to protect
from evil "friends" framing relays must also be implemented.
Detailed implementation details:
Coming soon.