Added something to DHT_hardening.txt

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irungentoo 2013-07-13 10:01:19 -04:00
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commit 835ef0320d

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@ -32,3 +32,39 @@ power devices)
Make each node test other nodes to see if they respond correctly before sending Make each node test other nodes to see if they respond correctly before sending
them as part of their send nodes response. them as part of their send nodes response.
... ...
=====
<slvr> DHT_hardening.txt > create thousands of "real" nodes that do nothing but
shit up our DHT with fake crap.
<slvr> This can be trivially solved by only storing verifiable data in the DHT.
<slvr> there is one attack you have not considered, which is based on the Sybil
attack
<slvr> I am assuming the DHT does say... a hash of a key in order to determine
which node to store data in, similar to Kad?
<slvr> If there happens to be a malicious node at that DHT address, they might
actively deny storing that data.
<slvr> This can be reduced by storing data at multiple places in the DHT
(equidistant points in DHT address space)
<slvr> Since DHT addresses are public keys, it is computationally infeasible for
an attacker to actively deny all storage locations.
<slvr> Recommended reading: S/Kademlia: A Practicable Approach Towards Secure
Key-Based Routing -- http://doc.tm.uka.de/2007/SKademlia_2007.pdf
<biribiri> Type: application/pdf; Size: 202KiB; Updated: 2033d 19h 32m 5s ago
(Tue, 18 Dec 2007 13:28:18 GMT);
<slvr> Tempering Kademlia with a Robust Identity Based System --
http://www.di.unito.it/~ruffo/concorso/Papers/p2p08.pdf
<biribiri> Type: application/pdf; Size: 145KiB; Updated: 1291d 23h 30m 12s ago
(Tue, 29 Dec 2009 09:30:28 GMT);
<slvr> Also of interest: "An Analysis of BitTorrent's Two Kademlia-Based DHTs"
--
http://www.tribler.org/trac/raw-attachment/wiki/AutoUpgradeToLastestVersion/
Measurement_of_Bittorrent_DHT_performance_and_deployed_clients.pdf
<biribiri> Type: application/pdf; charset=iso-8859-15; Size: 1.271MiB; Updated:
1669d 20h 25m 15s ago (Tue, 16 Dec 2008 12:44:08 GMT);