// Copyright 2019 Google LLC // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. // You may obtain a copy of the License at // // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 // // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and // limitations under the License. #ifndef SANDBOXED_API_SANDBOX2_POLICYBUILDER_H_ #define SANDBOXED_API_SANDBOX2_POLICYBUILDER_H_ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "absl/base/macros.h" #include "absl/container/flat_hash_set.h" #include "absl/log/check.h" #include "absl/status/statusor.h" #include "absl/strings/string_view.h" #include "absl/types/span.h" #include "sandboxed_api/sandbox2/mounts.h" #include "sandboxed_api/sandbox2/network_proxy/filtering.h" #include "sandboxed_api/sandbox2/policy.h" struct bpf_labels; namespace sandbox2 { class AllowAllSyscalls; // PolicyBuilder is a helper class to simplify creation of policies. The builder // uses fluent interface for convenience and increased readability of policies. // // To build a policy you simply create a new builder object, call methods on it // specifying what you want and finally call BuildOrDie() to generate you // policy. // // For instance this would generate a simple policy suitable for binaries doing // only computations: // // std::unique_ptr policy = // PolicyBuilder() // .AllowRead() // .AllowWrite() // .AllowExit() // .AllowSystemMalloc() // .BuildOrDie(); // // Note that operations are executed in the order they are dictated, though in // most cases this has no influence since the operations themselves commute. // // For instance these two policies are equivalent: // // auto policy = PolicyBuilder.AllowRead().AllowWrite().BuildOrDie(); // auto policy = PolicyBuilder.AllowWrite().AllowRead().BuildOrDie(); // // While these two are not: // // auto policy = PolicyBuilder.AllowRead().BlockSyscallWithErrno(__NR_read, EIO) // .BuildOrDie(); // auto policy = PolicyBuilder.BlockSyscallWithErrno(__NR_read, EIO).AllowRead() // .BuildOrDie(); // // In fact the first one is equivalent to: // // auto policy = PolicyBuilder.AllowRead().BuildOrDie(); // // If you dislike the chained style, it is also possible to write the first // example as this: // // PolicyBuilder builder; // builder.AllowRead(); // builder.AllowWrite(); // builder.AllowExit(); // builder.AllowSystemMalloc(); // auto policy = builder.BuildOrDie(); // // For a more complicated example, see examples/persistent/persistent_sandbox.cc class PolicyBuilder final { public: // Possible CPU fence modes for `AllowRestartableSequences()` enum CpuFenceMode { // Allow only fast fences for restartable sequences. kRequireFastFences, // Allow fast fences as well as slow fences if fast fences are unavailable. kAllowSlowFences, }; static constexpr absl::string_view kDefaultHostname = "sandbox2"; // Seccomp takes a 16-bit filter length, so the limit would be 64k. // We set it lower so that there is for sure some room for the default policy. static constexpr size_t kMaxUserPolicyLength = 30000; using BpfFunc = const std::function(bpf_labels&)>&; // Appends code to allow a specific syscall PolicyBuilder& AllowSyscall(uint32_t num); // Appends code to allow a number of syscalls PolicyBuilder& AllowSyscalls(absl::Span nums); // Appends code to block a syscalls while setting errno to the error given. PolicyBuilder& BlockSyscallsWithErrno(absl::Span nums, int error); // Appends code to block a specific syscall and setting errno. PolicyBuilder& BlockSyscallWithErrno(uint32_t num, int error); // Appends code to allow waiting for events on epoll file descriptors. // Allows these syscalls: // - epoll_wait // - epoll_pwait // - epoll_pwait2 PolicyBuilder& AllowEpollWait(); // Appends code to allow using epoll. // Allows these syscalls: // - epoll_create // - epoll_create1 // - epoll_ctl // - epoll_wait // - epoll_pwait // - epoll_pwait2 PolicyBuilder& AllowEpoll(); // Appends code to allow initializing an inotify instance. // Allows these syscalls: // - inotify_init // - inotify_init1 PolicyBuilder& AllowInotifyInit(); // Appends code to allow synchronous I/O multiplexing. // Allows these syscalls: // - pselect6 // - select PolicyBuilder& AllowSelect(); // Appends code to allow exiting. // Allows these syscalls: // - exit // - exit_group PolicyBuilder& AllowExit(); // Appends code to allow restartable sequences and necessary /proc files. // Allows these syscalls: // - rseq // - mmap(..., PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, ...) // - getcpu // - membarrier // - futex(WAIT) // - futex(WAKE) // - rt_sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK) // Allows these files: // - "/proc/cpuinfo" // - "/proc/stat" // And this directory (including subdirs/files): // - "/sys/devices/system/cpu/" // // If `cpu_fence_mode` is `kAllowSlowFences`, also permits slow CPU fences. // Allows these syscalls: // - sched_getaffinity // - sched_setaffinity // Allows these files: // - "/proc/self/cpuset" // // If `cpu_fence_mode` is `kRequireFastFences`, RSEQ functionality may not // be enabled if fast CPU fences are not available. // // This function enables namespaces! If your policy disables namespaces, // the conflict will cause an error when the policy is built. You should // call AllowRestartableSequences() instead; see below for instructions. PolicyBuilder& AllowRestartableSequencesWithProcFiles( CpuFenceMode cpu_fence_mode); // Appends code to allow restartable sequences. // See above for the allowed syscalls and, more importantly, for the files // that you are responsible for allowing via the deprecated `Fs` mechanism. PolicyBuilder& AllowRestartableSequences(CpuFenceMode cpu_fence_mode); // Appends code to allow the scudo version of malloc, free and // friends. This should be used in conjunction with namespaces. If scudo // options are passed to the sandboxee through an environment variable, access // to "/proc/self/environ" will have to be allowed by the policy. // // Note: This function is tuned towards the secure scudo allocator. If you are // using another implementation, this function might not be the most // suitable. PolicyBuilder& AllowScudoMalloc(); // Appends code to allow the system-allocator version of malloc, free and // friends. // // Note: This function is tuned towards the malloc implementation in glibc. If // you are using another implementation, this function might not be the // most suitable. PolicyBuilder& AllowSystemMalloc(); // Appends code to allow the tcmalloc version of malloc, free and // friends. PolicyBuilder& AllowTcMalloc(); // Allows system calls typically used by the LLVM sanitizers (address // sanitizer, memory sanitizer, and thread sanitizer). This method is // intended as a best effort for adding system calls that are common to many // binaries. It may not be fully inclusive of all potential system calls for // all binaries. PolicyBuilder& AllowLlvmSanitizers(); // Appends code to allow mmap. Specifically this allows mmap and mmap2 syscall // on architectures where this syscalls exist. PolicyBuilder& AllowMmap(); // Appends code to allow calling futex with the given operation. PolicyBuilder& AllowFutexOp(int op); // Appends code to allow opening and possibly creating files or directories. // Allows these sycalls: // - creat // - open // - openat PolicyBuilder& AllowOpen(); // Appends code to allow calling stat, fstat and lstat. // Allows these sycalls: // - fstat // - fstat64 // - fstatat // - fstatat64 // - fstatfs // - fstatfs64 // - lstat // - lstat64 // - newfstatat // - oldfstat // - oldlstat // - oldstat // - stat // - stat64 // - statfs // - statfs64 // - ustat PolicyBuilder& AllowStat(); // Appends code to allow checking file permissions. // Allows these syscalls: // - access // - faccessat PolicyBuilder& AllowAccess(); // Appends code to allow duplicating file descriptors. // Allows these syscalls: // - dup // - dup2 // - dup3 PolicyBuilder& AllowDup(); // Appends code to allow creating pipes. // Allows these syscalls: // - pipe // - pipe2 PolicyBuilder& AllowPipe(); // Appends code to allow changing file permissions. // Allows these syscalls: // - chmod // - fchmod // - fchmodat PolicyBuilder& AllowChmod(); // Appends code to allow changing file ownership. // Allows these syscalls: // - chown // - lchown // - fchown // - fchownat PolicyBuilder& AllowChown(); // Appends code to the policy to allow reading from file descriptors. // Allows these sycalls: // - read // - readv // - preadv // - pread64 PolicyBuilder& AllowRead(); // Appends code to the policy to allow writing to file descriptors. // Allows these sycalls: // - write // - writev // - pwritev // - pwrite64 PolicyBuilder& AllowWrite(); // Appends code to allow reading directories. // Allows these sycalls: // - getdents // - getdents64 PolicyBuilder& AllowReaddir(); // Appends code to allow reading symbolic links. // Allows these sycalls: // - readlink // - readlinkat PolicyBuilder& AllowReadlink(); // Appends code to allow creating links. // Allows these sycalls: // - link // - linkat PolicyBuilder& AllowLink(); // Appends code to allow creating symbolic links. // Allows these sycalls: // - symlink // - symlinkat PolicyBuilder& AllowSymlink(); // Appends code to allow creating directories. // Allows these sycalls: // - mkdir // - mkdirat PolicyBuilder& AllowMkdir(); // Appends code to allow changing file timestamps. // Allows these sycalls: // - futimens // - utime // - utimensat // - utimes PolicyBuilder& AllowUtime(); // Appends code to allow safe calls to fcntl. // Allows these sycalls: // - fcntl // - fcntl64 (on architectures where it exists) // // The above are only allowed when the cmd is one of: // F_GETFD, F_SETFD, F_GETFL, F_SETFL, F_GETLK, F_SETLKW, F_SETLK, // F_DUPFD, F_DUPFD_CLOEXEC PolicyBuilder& AllowSafeFcntl(); // Appends code to allow creating new processes. // Allows these sycalls: // - fork // - vfork // - clone // // Note: while this function allows the calls, the default policy is run first // and it has checks for dangerous flags which can create a violation. See // sandbox2/policy.cc for more details. PolicyBuilder& AllowFork(); // Appends code to allow waiting for processes. // Allows these sycalls: // - waitpid (on architectures where it exists) // - wait4 PolicyBuilder& AllowWait(); // Appends code to allow setting alarms / interval timers. // Allows these sycalls: // - alarm (on architectures where it exists) // - setitimer PolicyBuilder& AllowAlarm(); // Appends code to allow setting up signal handlers, returning from them, etc. // Allows these sycalls: // - rt_sigaction // - rt_sigreturn // - rt_procmask // - signal (on architectures where it exists) // - sigaction (on architectures where it exists) // - sigreturn (on architectures where it exists) // - sigprocmask (on architectures where it exists) PolicyBuilder& AllowHandleSignals(); // Appends code to allow doing the TCGETS ioctl. // Allows these sycalls: // - ioctl (when the first argument is TCGETS) PolicyBuilder& AllowTCGETS(); // Appends code to allow to getting the current time. // Allows these sycalls: // - time // - gettimeofday // - clock_gettime PolicyBuilder& AllowTime(); // Appends code to allow sleeping in the current thread. // Allow these syscalls: // - clock_nanosleep // - nanosleep PolicyBuilder& AllowSleep(); // Appends code to allow getting the uid, euid, gid, etc. // - getuid + geteuid + getresuid // - getgid + getegid + getresgid // - getuid32 + geteuid32 + getresuid32 (on architectures where they exist) // - getgid32 + getegid32 + getresgid32 (on architectures where they exist) // - getgroups PolicyBuilder& AllowGetIDs(); // Appends code to allow getting the pid, ppid and tid. // Allows these syscalls: // - getpid // - getppid // - gettid PolicyBuilder& AllowGetPIDs(); // Appends code to allow getting process groups. // Allows these syscalls: // - getpgid // - getpgrp PolicyBuilder& AllowGetPGIDs(); // Appends code to allow getting the rlimits. // Allows these sycalls: // - getrlimit // - ugetrlimit (on architectures where it exist) PolicyBuilder& AllowGetRlimit(); // Appends code to allow setting the rlimits. // Allows these sycalls: // - setrlimit // - usetrlimit (on architectures where it exist) PolicyBuilder& AllowSetRlimit(); // Appends code to allow reading random bytes. // Allows these sycalls: // - getrandom (with no flags or GRND_NONBLOCK) // PolicyBuilder& AllowGetRandom(); // Appends code to allow configuring wipe-on-fork memory // Allows these syscalls: // - madvise (with advice equal to -1 or MADV_WIPEONFORK). PolicyBuilder& AllowWipeOnFork(); // Enables syscalls required to use the logging support enabled via // Client::SendLogsToSupervisor() // Allows the following: // - Writes // - kill(0, SIGABRT) (for LOG(FATAL)) // - clock_gettime // - gettid // - close PolicyBuilder& AllowLogForwarding(); // Appends code to allow deleting files and directories. // Allows these syscalls: // - rmdir (if available) // - unlink (if available) // - unlinkat PolicyBuilder& AllowUnlink(); // Appends code to allow renaming files // Allows these syscalls: // - rename (if available) // - renameat // - renameat2 PolicyBuilder& AllowRename(); // Appends code to allow creating event notification file descriptors. // Allows these syscalls: // - eventfd (if available) // - eventfd2 PolicyBuilder& AllowEventFd(); // Appends code to allow polling files. // Allows these syscalls: // - poll (if available) // - ppoll PolicyBuilder& AllowPoll(); // Appends code to allow setting the name of a thread // Allows the following // - prctl(PR_SET_NAME, ...) PolicyBuilder& AllowPrctlSetName(); // Enables the syscalls necessary to start a statically linked binary // // NOTE: This will call BlockSyscallWithErrno(__NR_readlink, ENOENT). If you // do not want readlink blocked, put a different call before this call. // // The current list of allowed syscalls are below. However you should *not* // depend on the specifics, as these will change whenever the startup code // changes. // // - uname, // - brk, // - set_tid_address, // - set_robust_list, // - futex(FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET, ...) // - rt_sigaction(0x20, ...) // - rt_sigaction(0x21, ...) // - rt_sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, ...) // - arch_prctl(ARCH_SET_FS) // // Additionally it will block calls to readlink. PolicyBuilder& AllowStaticStartup(); // In addition to syscalls allowed by AllowStaticStartup, also allow reading, // seeking, mmapping and closing files. It does not allow opening them, as // the mechanism for doing so depends on whether GetFs-checks are used or not. PolicyBuilder& AllowDynamicStartup(); // Appends a policy, which will be run on the specified syscall. // This policy must be written without labels. If you need labels, use // the overloaded function passing a BpfFunc object instead of the // sock_filter. PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnSyscall(uint32_t num, absl::Span policy); // Appends a policy, which will be run on the specified syscall. // This policy may use labels. // Example of how to use it: // builder.AddPolicyOnSyscall( // __NR_socket, [](bpf_labels& labels) -> std::vector { // return { // ARG(0), // domain is first argument of socket // JEQ(AF_UNIX, JUMP(&labels, af_unix)), // JEQ(AF_NETLINK, JUMP(&labels, af_netlink)), // KILL, // // LABEL(&labels, af_unix), // ARG(1), // JEQ(SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_NONBLOCK, ALLOW), // KILL, // // LABEL(&labels, af_netlink), // ARG(2), // JEQ(NETLINK_ROUTE, ALLOW), // }; // }); PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnSyscall(uint32_t num, BpfFunc f); // Appends a policy, which will be run on the specified syscalls. // This policy must be written without labels. PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnSyscalls(absl::Span nums, absl::Span policy); // Appends a policy, which will be run on the specified syscalls. // This policy may use labels. PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnSyscalls(absl::Span nums, BpfFunc f); // Equivalent to AddPolicyOnSyscalls(mmap_syscalls, policy), where // mmap_syscalls is a subset of {__NR_mmap, __NR_mmap2}, which exists on the // target architecture. PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnMmap(absl::Span policy); // Equivalent to AddPolicyOnSyscalls(mmap_syscalls, f), where mmap_syscalls // is a subset of {__NR_mmap, __NR_mmap2}, which exists on the target // architecture. PolicyBuilder& AddPolicyOnMmap(BpfFunc f); // Builds the policy returning a unique_ptr to it. This should only be // called once. absl::StatusOr> TryBuild(); // Builds the policy returning a unique_ptr to it. This should only be // called once. This function will abort if an error happened in any of the // PolicyBuilder methods. std::unique_ptr BuildOrDie() { return TryBuild().value(); } // Adds a bind-mount for a file from outside the namespace to inside. This // will also create parent directories inside the namespace if needed. // // Calling these function will enable use of namespaces. PolicyBuilder& AddFile(absl::string_view path, bool is_ro = true); PolicyBuilder& AddFileAt(absl::string_view outside, absl::string_view inside, bool is_ro = true); // Best-effort function that adds the libraries and linker required by a // binary. // // This does not add the binary itself, only the libraries it depends on. // // This function should work correctly for most binaries, but you might need // to tweak it in some cases. // // This function is safe even for untrusted/potentially malicious binaries. // It adds libraries only from standard library dirs and ld_library_path. // // run `ldd` yourself and use AddFile or AddDirectory. PolicyBuilder& AddLibrariesForBinary(absl::string_view path, absl::string_view ld_library_path = {}); // Similar to AddLibrariesForBinary, but binary is specified with an open // fd. PolicyBuilder& AddLibrariesForBinary(int fd, absl::string_view ld_library_path = {}); // Adds a bind-mount for a directory from outside the namespace to // inside. This will also create parent directories inside the namespace if // needed. // // Calling these function will enable use of namespaces. PolicyBuilder& AddDirectory(absl::string_view path, bool is_ro = true); PolicyBuilder& AddDirectoryAt(absl::string_view outside, absl::string_view inside, bool is_ro = true); // Adds a tmpfs inside the namespace. This will also create parent // directories inside the namespace if needed. // // Calling this function will enable use of namespaces. PolicyBuilder& AddTmpfs(absl::string_view inside, size_t size); // Allows unrestricted access to the network by *not* creating a network // namespace. Note that this only disables the network namespace. To // actually allow networking, you would also need to allow networking // syscalls. Calling this function will enable use of namespaces. PolicyBuilder& AllowUnrestrictedNetworking(); // Enables the use of namespaces. // // Namespaces are enabled by default. // This is a no-op. ABSL_DEPRECATED("Namespaces are enabled by default; no need to call this") PolicyBuilder& EnableNamespaces() { CHECK(use_namespaces_) << "Namespaces cannot be both disabled and enabled"; requires_namespaces_ = true; return *this; } // Disables the use of namespaces. // // Call in order to use Sandbox2 without namespaces. // This is not recommended. PolicyBuilder& DisableNamespaces() { CHECK(!requires_namespaces_) << "Namespaces cannot be both disabled and enabled. You're probably " "using features that implicitly enable namespaces (SetHostname, " "AddFile, AddDirectory, AddDataDependency, AddLibrariesForBinary " "or similar)"; use_namespaces_ = false; return *this; } // Set hostname in the network namespace instead of default "sandbox2". // // Calling this function will enable use of namespaces. // It is an error to also call AllowUnrestrictedNetworking. PolicyBuilder& SetHostname(absl::string_view hostname); // Enables/disables stack trace collection on violations. PolicyBuilder& CollectStacktracesOnViolation(bool enable); // Enables/disables stack trace collection on signals (e.g. crashes / killed // from a signal). PolicyBuilder& CollectStacktracesOnSignal(bool enable); // Enables/disables stack trace collection on hitting a timeout. PolicyBuilder& CollectStacktracesOnTimeout(bool enable); // Enables/disables stack trace collection on getting killed by the sandbox // monitor / the user. PolicyBuilder& CollectStacktracesOnKill(bool enable); // Enables/disables stack trace collection on normal process exit. PolicyBuilder& CollectStacktracesOnExit(bool enable); // Changes the default action to ALLOW. // All syscalls not handled explicitly by the policy will thus be allowed. // Do not use in environment with untrusted code and/or data, ask // sandbox-team@ first if unsure. PolicyBuilder& DefaultAction(AllowAllSyscalls); ABSL_DEPRECATED("Use DefaultAction(sandbox2::AllowAllSyscalls()) instead") PolicyBuilder& DangerDefaultAllowAll(); // Allows syscalls that are necessary for the NetworkProxyClient PolicyBuilder& AddNetworkProxyPolicy(); // Allows syscalls that are necessary for the NetworkProxyClient and // the NetworkProxyHandler PolicyBuilder& AddNetworkProxyHandlerPolicy(); // Makes root of the filesystem writeable // Not recommended PolicyBuilder& SetRootWritable(); // Changes mounts propagation from MS_PRIVATE to MS_SLAVE. PolicyBuilder& DangerAllowMountPropagation() { allow_mount_propagation_ = true; return *this; } // Allows connections to this IP. PolicyBuilder& AllowIPv4(const std::string& ip_and_mask, uint32_t port = 0); PolicyBuilder& AllowIPv6(const std::string& ip_and_mask, uint32_t port = 0); private: friend class PolicyBuilderPeer; // For testing friend class StackTracePeer; static absl::StatusOr ValidateAbsolutePath( absl::string_view path); static absl::StatusOr ValidatePath(absl::string_view path); // Allows a limited version of madvise PolicyBuilder& AllowLimitedMadvise(); // Traps instead of denying ptrace. PolicyBuilder& TrapPtrace(); // Appends code to block a specific syscall and setting errno at the end of // the policy - decision taken by user policy take precedence. PolicyBuilder& OverridableBlockSyscallWithErrno(uint32_t num, int error); PolicyBuilder& SetMounts(Mounts mounts) { mounts_ = std::move(mounts); return *this; } std::vector ResolveBpfFunc(BpfFunc f); void StoreDescription(PolicyBuilderDescription* pb_description); // This function returns a PolicyBuilder so that we can use it in the status // macros PolicyBuilder& SetError(const absl::Status& status); Mounts mounts_; bool use_namespaces_ = true; bool requires_namespaces_ = false; bool allow_unrestricted_networking_ = false; bool allow_mount_propagation_ = false; std::string hostname_ = std::string(kDefaultHostname); bool collect_stacktrace_on_violation_ = true; bool collect_stacktrace_on_signal_ = true; bool collect_stacktrace_on_timeout_ = true; bool collect_stacktrace_on_kill_ = false; bool collect_stacktrace_on_exit_ = false; // Seccomp fields std::vector user_policy_; std::vector overridable_policy_; std::optional default_action_; bool user_policy_handles_bpf_ = false; bool user_policy_handles_ptrace_ = false; absl::flat_hash_set handled_syscalls_; // Error handling absl::Status last_status_; bool already_built_ = false; // Contains list of allowed hosts. absl::optional allowed_hosts_; }; } // namespace sandbox2 #endif // SANDBOXED_API_SANDBOX2_POLICYBUILDER_H_