mirror of https://github.com/containers/podman
Update module gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 to v2.6.3 [SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: renovate[bot] <29139614+renovate[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>pull/21989/head
renovate[bot]
GitHub
parent
1cbedfb7d5
commit
e220d1ce62
2
go.mod
2
go.mod
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@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ require (
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google.golang.org/appengine v1.6.8 // indirect
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google.golang.org/genproto/googleapis/rpc v0.0.0-20231212172506-995d672761c0 // indirect
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google.golang.org/grpc v1.61.0 // indirect
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.1 // indirect
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.3 // indirect
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gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2 v2.2.1 // indirect
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gopkg.in/tomb.v1 v1.0.0-20141024135613-dd632973f1e7 // indirect
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gopkg.in/yaml.v2 v2.4.0 // indirect
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4
go.sum
4
go.sum
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@ -820,8 +820,8 @@ gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c h1:Hei/4ADfdWqJk1ZMxUNpqntN
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gopkg.in/check.v1 v1.0.0-20201130134442-10cb98267c6c/go.mod h1:JHkPIbrfpd72SG/EVd6muEfDQjcINNoR0C8j2r3qZ4Q=
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gopkg.in/errgo.v2 v2.1.0/go.mod h1:hNsd1EY+bozCKY1Ytp96fpM3vjJbqLJn88ws8XvfDNI=
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gopkg.in/fsnotify.v1 v1.4.7/go.mod h1:Tz8NjZHkW78fSQdbUxIjBTcgA1z1m8ZHf0WmKUhAMys=
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.1 h1:qEzJlIDmG9q5VO0M/o8tGS65QMHMS1w01TQJB1VPJ4U=
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.1/go.mod h1:zzZDPkNNw/c9IE7Z9jr11mBZQhKQTMzoEEIoEdZlFBI=
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.3 h1:nt80fvSDlhKWQgSWyHyy5CfmlQr+asih51R8PTWNKKs=
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gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.3/go.mod h1:zzZDPkNNw/c9IE7Z9jr11mBZQhKQTMzoEEIoEdZlFBI=
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gopkg.in/inf.v0 v0.9.1 h1:73M5CoZyi3ZLMOyDlQh031Cx6N9NDJ2Vvfl76EDAgDc=
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gopkg.in/inf.v0 v0.9.1/go.mod h1:cWUDdTG/fYaXco+Dcufb5Vnc6Gp2YChqWtbxRZE0mXw=
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gopkg.in/natefinch/lumberjack.v2 v2.2.1 h1:bBRl1b0OH9s/DuPhuXpNl+VtCaJXFZ5/uEFST95x9zc=
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@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
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# v4.0.1
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## Fixed
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- An attacker could send a JWE containing compressed data that used large
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amounts of memory and CPU when decompressed by `Decrypt` or `DecryptMulti`.
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Those functions now return an error if the decompressed data would exceed
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250kB or 10x the compressed size (whichever is larger). Thanks to
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Enze Wang@Alioth and Jianjun Chen@Zhongguancun Lab (@zer0yu and @chenjj)
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for reporting.
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# v4.0.0
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This release makes some breaking changes in order to more thoroughly
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address the vulnerabilities discussed in [Three New Attacks Against JSON Web
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Tokens][1], "Sign/encrypt confusion", "Billion hash attack", and "Polyglot
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token".
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## Changed
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- Limit JWT encryption types (exclude password or public key types) (#78)
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- Enforce minimum length for HMAC keys (#85)
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- jwt: match any audience in a list, rather than requiring all audiences (#81)
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- jwt: accept only Compact Serialization (#75)
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- jws: Add expected algorithms for signatures (#74)
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- Require specifying expected algorithms for ParseEncrypted,
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ParseSigned, ParseDetached, jwt.ParseEncrypted, jwt.ParseSigned,
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jwt.ParseSignedAndEncrypted (#69, #74)
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- Usually there is a small, known set of appropriate algorithms for a program
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to use and it's a mistake to allow unexpected algorithms. For instance the
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"billion hash attack" relies in part on programs accepting the PBES2
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encryption algorithm and doing the necessary work even if they weren't
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specifically configured to allow PBES2.
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- Revert "Strip padding off base64 strings" (#82)
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- The specs require base64url encoding without padding.
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- Minimum supported Go version is now 1.21
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## Added
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- ParseSignedCompact, ParseSignedJSON, ParseEncryptedCompact, ParseEncryptedJSON.
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- These allow parsing a specific serialization, as opposed to ParseSigned and
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ParseEncrypted, which try to automatically detect which serialization was
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provided. It's common to require a specific serialization for a specific
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protocol - for instance JWT requires Compact serialization.
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[1]: https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-23/Presentations/US-23-Tervoort-Three-New-Attacks-Against-JSON-Web-Tokens.pdf
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# v3.0.3
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## Fixed
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- Limit decompression output size to prevent a DoS. Backport from v4.0.1.
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# v3.0.2
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## Fixed
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- DecryptMulti: handle decompression error (#19)
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## Changed
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- jwe/CompactSerialize: improve performance (#67)
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- Increase the default number of PBKDF2 iterations to 600k (#48)
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- Return the proper algorithm for ECDSA keys (#45)
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## Added
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- Add Thumbprint support for opaque signers (#38)
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# v3.0.1
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## Fixed
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- Security issue: an attacker specifying a large "p2c" value can cause
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JSONWebEncryption.Decrypt and JSONWebEncryption.DecryptMulti to consume large
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amounts of CPU, causing a DoS. Thanks to Matt Schwager (@mschwager) for the
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disclosure and to Tom Tervoort for originally publishing the category of attack.
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https://i.blackhat.com/BH-US-23/Presentations/US-23-Tervoort-Three-New-Attacks-Against-JSON-Web-Tokens.pdf
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# v2.6.3
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## Fixed
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- Limit decompression output size to prevent a DoS. Backport from v4.0.1.
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@ -1,118 +1,4 @@
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# Go JOSE
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# go-jose v2
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[](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v1)
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[](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2)
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[](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/go-jose/go-jose/master/LICENSE)
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[](https://travis-ci.org/go-jose/go-jose)
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[](https://coveralls.io/r/go-jose/go-jose)
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Package jose aims to provide an implementation of the Javascript Object Signing
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and Encryption set of standards. This includes support for JSON Web Encryption,
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JSON Web Signature, and JSON Web Token standards.
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**Disclaimer**: This library contains encryption software that is subject to
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the U.S. Export Administration Regulations. You may not export, re-export,
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transfer or download this code or any part of it in violation of any United
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States law, directive or regulation. In particular this software may not be
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exported or re-exported in any form or on any media to Iran, North Sudan,
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Syria, Cuba, or North Korea, or to denied persons or entities mentioned on any
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US maintained blocked list.
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## Overview
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The implementation follows the
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[JSON Web Encryption](http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7516) (RFC 7516),
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[JSON Web Signature](http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7515) (RFC 7515), and
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[JSON Web Token](http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7519) (RFC 7519).
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Tables of supported algorithms are shown below. The library supports both
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the compact and full serialization formats, and has optional support for
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multiple recipients. It also comes with a small command-line utility
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([`jose-util`](https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/tree/v2/jose-util))
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for dealing with JOSE messages in a shell.
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**Note**: We use a forked version of the `encoding/json` package from the Go
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standard library which uses case-sensitive matching for member names (instead
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of [case-insensitive matching](https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/json/current/msg03763.html)).
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This is to avoid differences in interpretation of messages between go-jose and
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libraries in other languages.
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### Versions
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We use [gopkg.in](https://gopkg.in) for versioning.
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[Version 2](https://gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2)
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([branch](https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/tree/v2),
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[doc](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2)) is the current version:
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import "gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2"
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The old `v1` branch ([go-jose.v1](https://gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v1)) will
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still receive backported bug fixes and security fixes, but otherwise
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development is frozen. All new feature development takes place on the `v2`
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branch. Version 2 also contains additional sub-packages such as the
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[jwt](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2/jwt) implementation
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contributed by [@shaxbee](https://github.com/shaxbee).
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### Supported algorithms
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See below for a table of supported algorithms. Algorithm identifiers match
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the names in the [JSON Web Algorithms](http://dx.doi.org/10.17487/RFC7518)
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standard where possible. The Godoc reference has a list of constants.
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Key encryption | Algorithm identifier(s)
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:------------------------- | :------------------------------
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RSA-PKCS#1v1.5 | RSA1_5
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RSA-OAEP | RSA-OAEP, RSA-OAEP-256
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AES key wrap | A128KW, A192KW, A256KW
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AES-GCM key wrap | A128GCMKW, A192GCMKW, A256GCMKW
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ECDH-ES + AES key wrap | ECDH-ES+A128KW, ECDH-ES+A192KW, ECDH-ES+A256KW
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ECDH-ES (direct) | ECDH-ES<sup>1</sup>
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Direct encryption | dir<sup>1</sup>
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<sup>1. Not supported in multi-recipient mode</sup>
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Signing / MAC | Algorithm identifier(s)
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:------------------------- | :------------------------------
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RSASSA-PKCS#1v1.5 | RS256, RS384, RS512
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RSASSA-PSS | PS256, PS384, PS512
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HMAC | HS256, HS384, HS512
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ECDSA | ES256, ES384, ES512
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Ed25519 | EdDSA<sup>2</sup>
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<sup>2. Only available in version 2 of the package</sup>
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Content encryption | Algorithm identifier(s)
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:------------------------- | :------------------------------
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AES-CBC+HMAC | A128CBC-HS256, A192CBC-HS384, A256CBC-HS512
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AES-GCM | A128GCM, A192GCM, A256GCM
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Compression | Algorithm identifiers(s)
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:------------------------- | -------------------------------
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DEFLATE (RFC 1951) | DEF
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### Supported key types
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See below for a table of supported key types. These are understood by the
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library, and can be passed to corresponding functions such as `NewEncrypter` or
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`NewSigner`. Each of these keys can also be wrapped in a JWK if desired, which
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allows attaching a key id.
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Algorithm(s) | Corresponding types
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:------------------------- | -------------------------------
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RSA | *[rsa.PublicKey](http://golang.org/pkg/crypto/rsa/#PublicKey), *[rsa.PrivateKey](http://golang.org/pkg/crypto/rsa/#PrivateKey)
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ECDH, ECDSA | *[ecdsa.PublicKey](http://golang.org/pkg/crypto/ecdsa/#PublicKey), *[ecdsa.PrivateKey](http://golang.org/pkg/crypto/ecdsa/#PrivateKey)
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EdDSA<sup>1</sup> | [ed25519.PublicKey](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519#PublicKey), [ed25519.PrivateKey](https://godoc.org/golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519#PrivateKey)
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AES, HMAC | []byte
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<sup>1. Only available in version 2 of the package</sup>
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## Examples
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[](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v1)
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[](https://godoc.org/gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2)
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Examples can be found in the Godoc
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reference for this package. The
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[`jose-util`](https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/tree/v2/jose-util)
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subdirectory also contains a small command-line utility which might be useful
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as an example.
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Version 2 of this library is no longer supported. [Please use v4
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instead](https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/go-jose/go-jose/v4).
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|
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@ -285,6 +285,9 @@ func (ctx rsaDecrypterSigner) signPayload(payload []byte, alg SignatureAlgorithm
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switch alg {
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case RS256, RS384, RS512:
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// TODO(https://github.com/go-jose/go-jose/issues/40): As of go1.20, the
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// random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be nil.
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// https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.20:src/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go;l=263;bpv=0;bpt=1
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out, err = rsa.SignPKCS1v15(RandReader, ctx.privateKey, hash, hashed)
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case PS256, PS384, PS512:
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out, err = rsa.SignPSS(RandReader, ctx.privateKey, hash, hashed, &rsa.PSSOptions{
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|
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@ -406,6 +406,9 @@ func (ctx *genericEncrypter) Options() EncrypterOptions {
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// Decrypt and validate the object and return the plaintext. Note that this
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// function does not support multi-recipient, if you desire multi-recipient
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// decryption use DecryptMulti instead.
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//
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// Automatically decompresses plaintext, but returns an error if the decompressed
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// data would be >250kB or >10x the size of the compressed data, whichever is larger.
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func (obj JSONWebEncryption) Decrypt(decryptionKey interface{}) ([]byte, error) {
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headers := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)
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@ -470,6 +473,9 @@ func (obj JSONWebEncryption) Decrypt(decryptionKey interface{}) ([]byte, error)
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// with support for multiple recipients. It returns the index of the recipient
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// for which the decryption was successful, the merged headers for that recipient,
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// and the plaintext.
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//
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// Automatically decompresses plaintext, but returns an error if the decompressed
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// data would be >250kB or >3x the size of the compressed data, whichever is larger.
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func (obj JSONWebEncryption) DecryptMulti(decryptionKey interface{}) (int, Header, []byte, error) {
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globalHeaders := obj.mergedHeaders(nil)
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@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ import (
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"compress/flate"
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"encoding/base64"
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"math/big"
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"strings"
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@ -85,7 +86,7 @@ func decompress(algorithm CompressionAlgorithm, input []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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}
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}
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// Compress with DEFLATE
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// deflate compresses the input.
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func deflate(input []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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output := new(bytes.Buffer)
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@ -97,15 +98,27 @@ func deflate(input []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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return output.Bytes(), err
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}
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// Decompress with DEFLATE
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// inflate decompresses the input.
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//
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// Errors if the decompressed data would be >250kB or >10x the size of the
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// compressed data, whichever is larger.
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func inflate(input []byte) ([]byte, error) {
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output := new(bytes.Buffer)
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reader := flate.NewReader(bytes.NewBuffer(input))
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|
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_, err := io.Copy(output, reader)
|
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if err != nil {
|
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maxCompressedSize := 10 * int64(len(input))
|
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if maxCompressedSize < 250000 {
|
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maxCompressedSize = 250000
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}
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|
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limit := maxCompressedSize + 1
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n, err := io.CopyN(output, reader, limit)
|
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if err != nil && err != io.EOF {
|
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return nil, err
|
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}
|
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if n == limit {
|
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("uncompressed data would be too large (>%d bytes)", maxCompressedSize)
|
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}
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|
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err = reader.Close()
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return output.Bytes(), err
|
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|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -402,6 +402,11 @@ func (ctx *symmetricKeyCipher) decryptKey(headers rawHeader, recipient *recipien
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if p2c <= 0 {
|
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("go-jose/go-jose: invalid P2C: must be a positive integer")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if p2c > 1000000 {
|
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// An unauthenticated attacker can set a high P2C value. Set an upper limit to avoid
|
||||
// DoS attacks.
|
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("go-jose/go-jose: invalid P2C: too high")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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// salt is UTF8(Alg) || 0x00 || Salt Input
|
||||
alg := headers.getAlgorithm()
|
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|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1374,7 +1374,7 @@ google.golang.org/protobuf/types/gofeaturespb
|
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google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/anypb
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google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb
|
||||
google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/timestamppb
|
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# gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.1
|
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# gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2 v2.6.3
|
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## explicit
|
||||
gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2
|
||||
gopkg.in/go-jose/go-jose.v2/cipher
|
||||
|
|
|
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