By *Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider and Michael Zohner* in USENIX Security Symposium 2014 [1], *Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider, Gil Segev and Michael Zohner* in USENIX Security Symposium 2015 [2], and *Benny Pinkas, Thomas Schneider and Michael Zohner* in ePrint [3]. Please note that the code is currently being restructured and not all routines might work correctly. The PSI code is licensed under AGPLv3, see the LICENSE file for a copy of the license. The implementations for performing PSI on a sets of a billion elements can be found [here](https://github.com/Oleksandr-Tkachenko/PSI_Intersection).
This code is provided as a experimental implementation for testing purposes and should not be used in a productive environment. We cannot guarantee security and correctness.
### Requirements
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* A **Linux distribution** of your choice (the code was developed and tested with recent versions of [Ubuntu](http://www.ubuntu.com/)).
Please note that downloading this project as ZIP file will yield compilation errors, since the Miracl library is included as external project. To solve this, download the Miracl sources in commit version `cff161b` (found [here](https://github.com/CertiVox/Miracl/tree/cff161bad6364548b361b63938a988db23f60c2a) and extract the contents of the main folder in `src/externals/Miracl`. Then, continue with steps 2 and 3.
These commands will run the naive hashing protocol and compute the intersection on the 1024 randomly generated emails in sample_sets/emails_alice.txt and sample_sets/emails_bob.txt (where 3 intersecting elements were altered). To use a different protocol, the ['-p'] option can be varied as follows:
The generator uses the first names, family names, and email providers listed in the corresponding files in `sample_sets/emailgenerator/` as base for the generation.
[1] B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, M. Zohner. Faster Private Set Intersection Based on OT Extension. USENIX Security 2014: 797-812. Full version available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/447.
[2] B. Pinkas, T. Schneider, G. Segev, M. Zohner. Phasing: Private Set Intersection using Permutation-based Hashing. USENIX Security 2015. Full version available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/634.
[5] C. Meadows. A more efficient cryptographic matchmaking protocol for use in the absence of a continuously available third party. In IEEE S&P’86, pages 134–137. IEEE, 1986.